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As climate change research burgeons at a remarkable pace, it is intersecting with research
regarding indigenous and rural people in fascinating ways. Yet, there remains a significant
gap in integrated quantitative and qualitative methods for studying rural climate change
perception and policy support, especially with regard to Native Americans. The objectives of
this paper are to utilize our multi-method approach of integrating surveys, interviews,
video, literature and fieldwork in innovative ways to: (1) address the aforementioned gap in
rural studies, while advancing knowledge regarding effective methodologies for investiga-
tion of linkages between socio-political variables and climate change perceptions; and (2)
perform comparative primary research regarding the climate change assumptions, risk
perceptions, policy preferences, observations and knowledge among rural Nevada’s tribes
and tribal environmental leaders, non-native ranchers and farmers, and America’s general
public. The results of this study have ramifications for similar populations in arid and semi-
arid lands, particularly in the U.S. Southwest.
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Major climate change perception surveys have been con-
ducted in the U.S. within the last 20 years (Bord et al., 1998;
O’Connor et al., 1999; Krosnick et al., 2000; Leiserowitz, 2005,
2006; Kellstedt et al., 2008; Brody et al., 2008; Leiserowitz et al.,
2009; Malka et al., 2009; McCright, 2010; McCright and* Corresponding author at: 4505 S. Maryland Pkwy, Mailstop 455003, 8
E-mail addresses: bill.smith@unlv.edu, drsmithuiowa@yahoo.com
safi.ahmad74@gmail.com (A.S. Safi), kchief@arizona.edu (K. Chief).
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.03.007
1462-9011/# 2014 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is 
creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/3.0/).Dunlap, 2011a,b). Pew Research Center (2010) polls found
that 57% (2009) and 59% (2010) of Americans believed that
global warming was occurring. From 2006 to 2008 Pew
reported 70–79%. Meanwhile, survey data from Borick and
Rabe (2010) varied from 69% to 75%. Related surveys have
also been conducted on a state-scale, for example,
concerning Michigan and Virginia (Dietz et al., 2007; Shwom
et al., 2008, 2010), New Hampshire (Hamilton, 2010), and9154-5003, USA. Tel.: +1 909 782 8198.
 (W.J. Smith Jr.), zhwliu@gmail.com (Z. Liu),
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Rabe, 2010).
Fewer studies have focused on rural American climate
change perceptions. Hamilton and Keim (2009) surveyed
nineteen rural counties in nine states and noted a significant
perception-temperature influence. Coles and Scott (2009)
conducted seventeen interviews in Arizona, and found that
the major perceived climatic risks were drought, floods, and
frosts, and that farmers and ranchers continued to rely on past
experiences and short-range forecasts as adaptive strategies.
While Arbuckle et al. (2013) studied farmers’ beliefs in climate
change in the Midwest.
2. Methods
In this paper we explore perceptions, knowledge and
preferences regarding climate change with less-powerful
actors who have an intimate connection to their local,
and sometimes extreme, Nevada environment. Supporting
their voices is important, as Sachs (1993) and others have
indicated that the way potential ‘‘multifaceted dangers to
mankind’’ are often wrapped-up in high level discourse may
bring the major players at the table (i.e. UN mega-confer-
ences), but the result can be a merging of views that can mute
the smaller actor and calls for necessary radical change. A
mixed-method approach can capture the views of these actors
(Supplemental detailed discussion of our study communities
and regional climate change predictions are located in
Appendix A).
2.1. Video
Through ‘‘Community Based Participatory Methods’’ (CBPR)
we engaged in fieldwork with the Summit Lake Paiute Tribe
(SL) and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (PL), including a rare
opportunity to film the spawning of the Lahontan Cutthroat
Trout. Found only in Nevada’s mountainous northwest
corner, its viability under future climate change scenarios
spurs deep tribal concern (Figs. 1–5, and video by Smith and
Fruth, 2012). The tribes were interviewed on camera and had
editorial input, raising salient climate justice issues that
attracted the interest of academic, governmental, tribal, NGO,
and other actors in areas such as professional training,
research, and education (Figs. 6 and 7) (2013 Environmental
Politics). This research output provided information used
throughout this paper, helped us to scope which research
questions would be important to address through our survey
construction, highlighted important questions to pursue
regarding climate observations, and culturally and geograph-
ically contextualized the scenarios examined. While our
linkages to broader literature helped ensure ‘broader
impacts,’ the CBPR approach ensured local relevance with
regard to the outputs produced. Buy-in to this process was
partially fueled by groups’ desires to understand what their
own ‘public’ perceived and would also support in relation to
climate change impacts, policies, and adaptation, and also to
give voice to vital observations that they believed were being
made by local persons, but were not being considered by
outsiders.2.2. Surveys
To study tribal climate and risk perceptions, assumptions,
knowledge and policy preferences in relation to climate
change we primarily researched three NA groups and
ranchers/farmers (RF) (the RF were non-Native American).
Tribal groups included the SL, PL, and environmental
managers (EM) of tribes across Nevada (ITCN, 2014). Surveys
were tied to the literature at the time of creation, utilized Likert
scale, open-ended and other formats, with outputs trans-
formed into Access and spatial databases. Our survey analysis
integrates, but is not limited to, t-tests, unstructured and
semi-structured interview analysis, geostatistics (most of
which do not appear in this paper) and basic statistics.
Information from our interviews, video and field observations
facilitated survey interpretation.
The EM survey response rate was 54% (N = 24). The EM
represent statewide tribal governmental perspectives,
knowledge, and action plans. Respondents were from
various Native American tribes. Their views are crucial,
powerfully influencing tribal perception, policies, and
planning. We also conducted PL tribal-wide surveys on its
general public, with a response rate of 20% (N = 549). We
targeted tribal households through mail and house-to-
house surveys distributed by a tribal member undergradu-
ate researcher (Headwaters Economics, 2012). SL research
focused on interviews with a core group of six tribal leaders
and fieldwork. The RF survey achieved a 26% response rate
(N = 481), solid for a survey-resistant group and lengthy
survey (Fig. 8).
3. Results and discussion
3.1. Profiles
Table 1 shows that EM have much in common with the RF
community in terms of education, and both groups have major
land and water management responsibilities. The relative
similarities in formal education between the EM and RF groups
may reduce the difference in this one important variable for
comparative analysis across subgroups, but not necessarily
across major differences in informal education. We crystallize
the demographic and political profiles of our study groups in
Table 2, and also note their fundamental perceptions regard-
ing the existence and origin of climate change and its
associated priority level.
RF were 73% Republican, 14% Democrat, 10% independent
and 2% other and no party (N = 436). Underscoring the
contrast, they are 43% very conservative, 33% conservative,
16% middle of the road, 7% liberal, and 1% very liberal. PL is
52% Democrat and only 5% Republican (N = 103); whereas,
7.8% are independent with 9.7% ‘‘other party.’’ Interestingly,
24% indicate no interest in politics.
Differences in RF and PL perspectives do not reflect major
income disparities. Sixty-two percent of all RF who responded to
our surveys earn between $0 and $25,000, with virtually no one
making greater than between $100,000 and $150,000 annually
(N = 425). And with the PL having 46% between $0 and $25,000
and virtually no one making greater than $120,000 (N = 99).
Fig. 1 – Nevada’s tribes and bands. Re., Reservation. Ra., Ranch; Co., Colony.
It impacts my life and my family’s life in ways that we cannot
measure, there are changes happening faster than expected.
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change are increasingly important in environmental policy
and management modifications (Brody et al., 2008; Leiser-
owitz, 2005). Selected outputs of our research regarding
opinion, risk perception, knowledge and policy support are
highlighted below (see also Safi et al., 2012 for a more specific
focus on risk). Quotes leading subsections are important, as
they give relatively unfiltered voice to the character of
qualitative responses to questions. The sections below exploretiming, impacts, drought, sector analysis, space and time,
observations, policy and voluntary action, and trust in
government with regard to climate change.
3.2. Belief in climate change
PL
Fig. 2 – Nevada’s Native American Reservations.
RF
There are many local changes due to land use changes. At larger scale
there are effects from sunspots, magnetic field strengthens seafloor
and terrestrial volcanism; changes in h/t of earth axis among the
factors that occurring cycles that sometimes overlap and strengthen
their respective effects. No one yet explained very well the difference
between variation and change across a suite of scales.
. . . there is a major debate in the scientific world about climate change.
Not enough info to support either sides claim. . . We know it’s hot.
It is caused by elections, policy makers/scientists looking to
redistribute wealth.
. . .even cooler in the summer than 30 years ago. The morons in
Washington DC. . .
How many people and manufacturing plants were here when the
dinosaurs disappeared?
The only absolute authority on the future assures me that ‘‘seed
time and harvest will continue as long as the world remains’’
Genesis 8:22 (God).
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television. About 48% of respondents receive information from
television, 10% from Internet sources, 8% from radio (N = 106).
References to newspaper-based consumption are only 5%,
with scant reference to tribal-based news or tribal climate
change literature. RF also mostly receive information from
television (61%), though more tap the Internet (22%) and radio,
which is often conservative in rural Nevada (29%) (N = 481).
The percentage of RF consuming information through news-
papers is over double that of PL at 11%, with several mentions
specifically of the Wall Street Journal, and it is interesting to
Fig. 3 – SL indigenous fishing methods.
Fig. 4 – Threatened Lahontan Cutthroat trout running tiny Mahogany Creek during spawning. An event the tribe is
concerned could be impacted by climate change.
Fig. 5 – Mr. William Cowan, Summit Lake Paiute Tribe, lent through a USFW program allowing tribal members work on tribal
land.
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Fig. 6 – Initial video viewership by affiliation.
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‘‘all.’’ Both groups report only minimal consumption of
government or NGO pieces and technical reports.
Beliefs regarding the status of climate change and the role
of human activity in creating it are found in Figs. 9 and 10. The
fundamental questions regarding the existence of climate
change, and if human activity is playing a significant role, are
answered in the affirmative by about 3/4 of PL respondents
(N = 99). Only a small percentage of PL respondents lie at the
extremes of perceiving human activity as either playing the
only, or zero, role in climate change (7% each). While 100%
(N = 14) of EM believe that climate change is happening and
greenhouse gases are a cause. Only 60% of Nevada’s farmers
and ranchers agree that we are in a period of climate change,Fig. 7 – Video views by purpose.and a mere 29% believe that human activity is playing a
significant role, whereas, Arbuckle et al. (2013) reported 66%
and 41% for Midwest farmers.
Along the same lines, Biello (2013) notes a corn farmer and an
economist for the Iowa Farm Bureau arguing that climate change
always happens, but rejecting human causality. At least some
U.S. ranching and farming leaders share this view. The author
quotes American Farm Bureau Federation spokesman Mace
Thornton as stating, ‘‘We’re not convinced that the climate
change we’re seeing is anthropogenic in origin. We don’t think
the science is there to show that in a convincing way’’ (Internet).
A t-test reveals clear differences between PL and RF in
terms of whether they believe that we are in a period of
climate change. Answers ranged from 1 Strongly disagree, 2
Disagree, 3 Not decided, 4 Agree, to 5 Strongly agree.
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
RF 470 3.47 1.20
NA 98 3.87 1.02 158 3.39 0.0009
Another t-test shows a significant difference between the
views of PL and RF regarding whether human activity has been
playing a significant role in recent climate change. Answers
ranged from 1 Strongly disagree, 2 Disagree, 3 Not decided, 4
Agree, to 5 Strongly agree.
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
RF 467 2.55 1.37
NA 99 3.99 1.04 179 11.85 <0.0001
Fig. 8 – RF survey responses.
Table 1 – Formal Western education.
Study group N Middle
school
(%)
High
school
(%)
Some
college
(%)
2-year
college
(%)
4-year
college
(%)
Master
degree
(%)
Advanced
degree (%)
Ph.D.
degree
(%)
Environmental managers 11 9 9 9 46 9 18
Ranchers and farmers 476 1 18 23 9 33 9 5 2
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe 99 39 28 15 10 7 1
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performed additional analysis on this fundamental issue. We
studied responses to two statements: (1) ‘‘I believe that we are in a
period of climate change;’’ and (2) ‘‘I believe that human activity
has been playing a significant role in recent climate change.’’ The
scale ranged from (1) Disagree, (2) Not decided, to (3) Agree.
Such factors as gender, marital status, and education had
moderate effects on an individual’s scientific knowledge of
climate change. The strongest factors influencing one’s acceptance
and knowledge of climate change were partisan affiliation and
political ideology. Spearman’s rank correlation test showed that
party and political ideology were significantly correlated
(r = 0.47, P < 0.0001, N = 421). Both Democrat and independent
RF were more likely than Republicans to believe that we are in
a period of climate change. Democrats were over four times as
likely to perceive that human activity has been playing a
significant role in recent climate change.
Such strong associations were not observed for any other
categories except political ideology, wherein political ideol-ogy was significantly correlated with political party affilia-
tion. This is consistent with previous research on
the partisan gap in climate change opinion nationwide
(Dietz et al., 2007; Pew Research Center, 2007; Borick and
Rabe, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011a,b). Further, Spear-
man’s rank correlation analyses between party affiliation
and these two climate change knowledge variables statisti-
cally validated the polarization (r = 0.21, P < 0.0001, N = 414
for party and #1; and r = 0.42, P < 0.0001, N = 412 for party
and #2). Very similar significant Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficients were identified between party and State-
ment #1 (r = 0.30). The correlation coefficient between party
and cause of climate change from this research was nearly
the same as that from a Gallup survey in 2008 (Pearson
correlation coefficient of 0.344) (Dunlap and McCright, 2008).
A greater percentage of women than men believed that
climate change is happening (69–58%), and that it is mainly
caused by human activities (45–24%). The overall relationship
between gender and scientific knowledge of climate change
Fig. 9 – PL: Occurrence and origins of climate change.
Table 2 – Population and climate statistics.
Variable Coding Pyramid Lake PT Farmer/rancher
N Mean Std. dev. N Mean Std. dev.
Age Number in years 100 47.4 15.06 474 61.8 13.27
Gender 1 (female) to 2 (male) 104 1.39 0.49 478 1.74 0.44
Marital status 1 (single/divorced/widowed) to
2 (married)
101 1.41 0.49 475 1.84 0.37
Education 1 (less than high school) to 4
(Bachelor’s degree or higher)
99 2.8 0.73 476 3.3 0.78
Party affiliation 1 (Republican), 2 (Democrat), 3
(independent), 4 (other), 5 (no party)
101 2.96 1.36 436 1.44 0.85
Political ideology 1 (very liberal) to 5 (very
conservative)
83 2.86 0.83 456 4.11 0.96
Annual household income 1 (less than $25,000) to 4 (more
than 1 million $)
97 1.78 0.9 425 1.72 1.06
In a period of climate change 1 (disagree) to 3 (agree) 98 2.64 0.63 470 2.4 0.82
Cause of climate change: role
of human activity
1 (disagree) to 3 (agree) 99 2.65 0.64 467 1.75 0.88
Climate change as a national
prioritya
1 (high priority) to 3 (low priority) 99 1.37 0.63 474 2.42 0.76
Personal importance of climate
change
1 (not important) to 2 (important) 95 1.87 0.33 454 1.69 0.46
Perceived climate change impact
indexb
Index (0–4) = average of the eight
variables
92 2.84 1.17 433 2.25 0.92
a Climate change as a national priority for EM was N = 11, mean = 1.07, and std. dev. = 0.27.
b Coding for eight variables of perceived climate change impacts: 0 (don’t know), 1 (not at all) to 4 (a great deal).
Fig. 10 – RF: Occurrence and origins of climate change.
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man–Kruskal Gamma; N = 468; P = 0.03). The gamma G was
0.23 (N = 313; P = 0.03) and 0.09 (N = 155, P = 0.29, non-
significant). For Statement #2 and gender, Nevada
female ranchers and farmers hold more scientifically accurateknowledge about climate change than do their male counterparts
(Goodman–Kruskal Gamma; N = 464; G = 0.30; P  0.001). More-
over, G was 0.30 (N = 464; P = 0.004), respectively. This is
consistent with the findings on climate change for national
surveys from McCright (2010), (Goodman–Kruskal Gamma,
both P  0.001), but is diametrically opposed to what has been
found with other measures of environmental knowledge (i.e.
Arcury et al., 1987; Hayes, 2001).
Gender was correlated with political ideology (r = 0.20,
P < 0.0001, N = 455) and party (r = 0.15, P = 0.002, N = 421). To
assess the relative importance of political variables (political
ideology and party) vs. gender, we calculated the gamma G
between climate change knowledge variables and political
ideology and party. The G was 0.46 (N = 414, P < 0.001) and 0.67
(N = 412, P < 0.001) between party and Statements #1 and #2,
respectively. For political ideology and Statements #1 and #2,
the associations were much more profound, G being 0.48
(N = 448, P < 0.001) and 0.73 (N = 445, P < 0.001), compared to
the paragraph above. Thus, the gender divide in climate change
knowledge was not overwhelming, although statistically significant,
compared to differences based regarding such demographic variables
as political ideology and party (Dunlap and McCright, 2008;
McCright, 2010).
3.3. Prioritization
Americans’ awareness of ‘‘global warming’’ or ‘‘climate
change’’ has generally risen since the 1980s (although they
perceive risk as limited and distant temporally and spatially).
However, the rise has been uneven (Leiserowitz et al., 2009,
2010; Leiserowitz, 2005, 2006; O’Connor et al., 1999; Bord et al.,
1998). Leiserowitz (2003) notes that in 1989 70% of
Americans viewed climate change seriously, and by 2003
that percentage rose to 92%. However, in recent years belief in
Table 3 – Prioritization of climate change.
Environmental
managers (%)
Pyramid
Lake Paiute
Tribe (%)
Ranchers
and
farmers (%)
Personal scale
Extremely
important
18 8
Very important 27 17
Somewhat
important
43 44
Not important
at all
12 31
Total 100 (N = 96) 100 (N = 454)
US scale
Top priority 36 18 3
High priority 57 53 13
Medium priority 7 21 25
Low priority 0 1 30
Not a priority 0 7 29
Total 100 (N = 14) 100 (N = 99) 100 (N = 474)
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American adults felt climate change was happening, com-
pared to 71% in 2008. Only 53% believed in an anthropogenic
trigger (complete or partial) in 2010, compared to 62% in 2008.
Comprehending the priority assigned to climate change by
stakeholders increases the understanding of potential policy
support. We explore the priority attached to climate change at
personal, tribal and national scales.
Our survey shows that climate change ranks third in the list
of key environmental problems identified by EM. A strong 93%
find it to be a high to top priority at the national scale, 7% a
medium priority (Table 3). At a personal scale, PL responses
were that 45% felt that climate change is very to extremely
important. Nationally, 71% found it a high to top priority, 21% a
medium priority.
RF responses at a personal scale were a mere 25% very to
extremely important, and 44% somewhat important, which is
similar to national data (N = 454). Also, 31% said that the issue
was not important at all, whereas, Leiserowitz et al. (2009)
showed a much lower percentage nationally at 11%. Signifi-
cant relationships were found between the perceived impor-
tance (regrouped at two levels) and party affiliation, political
orientation and gender (Goodman–Kruskal Gamma; G = 0.64,
0.84, and 0.45, respectively; all P < 0.0001). Republican,
conservative and male ranchers and farmers indicated
climate change as unimportant to themselves.
RF responses at the national scale were 16% for a high to top
priority, 25% a medium priority, and nearly a third (29%) not a
priority – more than four times the PL response. To provide
context, top and high priority responses in national surveys by
Leiserowitz et al. (2009) and WorldPublicOpinion.org (2009)Table 4 – Time frame of climate change impacts.
Group and time frame Now (%) 10 years (%) 25 yea
Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe (N = 96) 51 7.3 5.2
Ranchers and farmers (N = 444) 27 5 4 were 21% and 33%. The low priority responses also compare to
17% from the same Leiserowitz survey.
The relationships between perceived priority level and the
demographic variables of party, political ideology, and gender
were all strongly significant (Goodman–Kruskal Gamma;
G = 0.66, 0.78, and 0.41, respectively; all P < 0.0001). The Gamma
test shows significant relationships. While perceived priority
level is not significantly related with age, education, or income.
Republican, conservative and male ranchers and farmers
tended to view climate change as a low national priority –
which is discouraging in terms of potential policy support.
Another t-test at the personal scale also reveals significant
differences between PL and RF groups. Answers ranged from 1
Not at all important, 2 Somewhat important, 3 Very important,
to 4 Extremely important.
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
RF 454 2.01 0.89
NA 96 2.51 0.95 133 4.7 <0.0001
Meanwhile, a t-test at the U.S. scale manifests a significant
difference between the PL and RF. Answers ranged from 1 Top
priority, 2 High priority, 3 Medium priority, 4 Low priority, to 5
Not a priority.
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
RF 474 3.68 1.13
NA 99 2.26 1.01 154 12.46 <0.0001
3.4. Timing
From 2008 to 2010 the percentage of Americans who thought
that the people in the U.S. were being harmed now by climate
change decreased from 34% to 25%, while the percentage of
Americans who thought that the U.S. will never be harmed
increased from 15% to 23% (Leiserowitz et al., 2010).
However, a majority of tribal members that we surveyed
were aware of climate change and agree that human activity
plays a significant role in it, and many were concerned about
impacts in the short-term and beyond. PL tribal members
mostly (51%) perceive that climate change is impacting them
now, with 32% unsure of the timing, which is close to RF 36%
(Table 4), while 100% of EM believe that impacts are occurring
now.
The percentage of RF respondents believing that they are
being harmed now is about half that of PL (27%), which is close
to the national percentage reported above, with around 1/3
being unsure, and 1/4 anticipating never experiencing
impacts. Also, 1/3 anticipate harm either now or within the
next ten years (27% and 5%). RF findings are lower than
Leiserowitz et al. (2009) in their national study (34% presentrs (%) 50 years (%) 100 years (%) Never (%) Unsure (%)
 1 2.1 1 32.4
1 3 24 36
26.1%
80.0%
6.5%
64.5%
9.0%
52.0%
44.0%
37.0%
77.0%
18.0%
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40%
50%
60%
70%
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90%
Climate change Natural variabil ity Polluon Over-consumpon 
of water
Over-producon of 
greenhouse gases
Ranchers and farmers
Pyramid Lake Tribe
Fig. 11 – PL (N = 100) and RF (N = 479) beliefs regarding the causes of Nevada’s drought.
Less snow pack in the mountains, more water rainfall with
resulting lower summer water runoff and insufficient storage to
hold the winter moisture.
Less irrigation water due to reduced snowpack. Increase in insect
populations due to milder winters. Changes in pollination due
to timing of bloom & effects of heat on the bloom – setting of fruits
and vegetables. . . .mandatory irrigation pump interruption.
I don’t know if the continued domestic use increase is the cause
or less snow pack.
We had to let 2 fields sit idle in 2009 because we didn’t have water
in Rye Patch Dam.
Loss of plants species is already hurting the honey bee
populations and changing weather patterns and moisture
patterns are already affecting crop production. . . .wells 90% dry.
I believe climate change is coming to the point we are planning
to move, change lifestyle.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 0 1 – 1 2 2110tense, 13% future tense), and significantly lower than PL at
58%. Within the larger RF dataset we did not identify any
significant statistical relationships between the perceived
timing variable and age, gender, party affiliation, or political
orientation (Goodman–Kruskal Gamma tests). We found that
65% of self-identified liberal farmers and ranchers (N = 34) said
that climate change is harming people now, while those
percentages for conservatives, Democrats, and Republicans
were 21% (N = 327), 51% (N = 59), and 22% (N = 296). Sixty-eight
percent of conservatives (N = 327) and Republicans (N = 296)
selected ‘‘Never’’ or ‘‘Not sure.’’
We highlight that 3/4 of RF stated that impacts will ‘‘never
happen’’ or are ‘‘not sure’’ (VS. PL at about 1/3). Thus,
approaching this subgroup for support of policies based on
future-tense arguments is not likely to be effective.
3.5. Perceptions of impacts
EM
I think climate change has impacted the tribe because we do nothave enough water for our plants and animals. If we don’t have
these resources we don’t have anything.
It reverses the progress that has been already made especially
litigiously by law and mandate and through many management
changes.
PL
Less water for our lake, vegetation in areas of the reservation have
dried up, aquifers have dried up. I remember waist deep snow
(adult) years ago. We are lucky to get ankle deep snow these days.
Springs are no longer there on the reservation, less game available
and less native medicines to gather.
I think that the earlier melt off and runoff of snow packs are
happening because of warmer weather in winter season. Increased
wildfires because of drier, hotter summers.
RF
Who is to say that it would not be beneficial? Longer growing
season. Maybe it would snow more. . .and the water table would
rise. Being taxed to death to pay to correct it and give money to
developing countries. . . is what’s going to harm my family and
business.Late 1800s ice was harvested from rivers and lakes for summer
– not done since 1910s.3.5.1. Drought
As some of the quotes above underscore, the powerful drought
that has struck Nevada and the surrounding region of the U.S. is
the easiest mental link to make from climate change to concrete
local phenomena, and thus, the impacts of drought may
strongly influence climate change policy support. Fig. 11 reveals
that 52% of PL respondents find climate change directly
responsible for drought, which is double the RF percentage,
with demand-side abuse of water a major contributor (77%).
And, 93% of EM (N = 14) believe that Nevada is suffering severe
drought linked to climate change.
Only 26% of the RF community blame climate change for
drought. Natural variability dominates thinking at 80%.
Demand-side mismanagement of water is also a major issue
(65%).
3.6. Sector analysis
Figs. 12 and 13 represent sector analysis data regarding sectors
that may be impacted by climate change. Concerns regarding
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Fig. 13 – RF perceptions of potential impacts by sector (N = 439–444).
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public health lead for PL. And, concerns regarding food exist
for over 1/3. Business concerns hover just below 1/2.
Our figures regarding RF community responses manifest
35% ‘‘Not at all concerned’’ and 21% ‘‘Very concerned’’
responses on average across the board. This makes for a stark
comparison to the 13% ‘‘Not at all concerned’’ and 37% ‘‘Very
concerned’’ PL responses. Responses for all categories in the
‘‘Very, Moderately, Somewhat,’’ and ‘‘Not at all concerned’’
ranges are often more symmetrical for RF than PL. Though,
rather interestingly, responses are identical regarding the
linked themes of farming livelihood and irrigation of crops in
the ‘‘Very concerned’’ category. Nevertheless, there is
approximately a 10% spread between the study groups in
terms of ‘‘moderate concern’’ in both cases (RF communities
representing the smaller percentage). Especially large gaps
exist between the RF and PL in terms of being ‘‘Very
concerned’’ in the areas of ‘‘Ecosystem degradation’’ (15%
and 52%), ‘‘Extreme weather events’’ (12% and 36%), ‘‘Food
availability’’ (16% and 38%), ‘‘Public health’’ (10% and 45%),
and ‘‘Residential water availability’’ (25% and 58%).
We conducted t-tests, including an index, analyzing the
difference between the PL and RF views regarding, ‘‘To what
extent you are concerned about the following areas being
impacted by climate change in Nevada.’’ We discovered‘significant’ results. Answers ranged from 1 Not concerned
at all, 2 Somewhat concerned, 3 Moderately concerned, to 4
Very concerned:
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
(A) Economy
RF 444 2.27 1.15
NA 95 2.78 1.13 139 3.93 <0.0001
(B) Ecosystem degradation (i.e. forests, fisheries, wetlands)
RF 441 2.13 1.07
NA 92 3.28 0.89 150 10.87 <0.0001
(C) Extreme weather events
RF 442 2.07 1.05
NA 95 2.95 0.98 144 7.78 <0.0001
(D) Farming livelihood
RF 443 2.51 1.19
NA 95 2.74 1.04 152 1.89 0.06
(E) Food availability
RF 440 2.10 1.11
NA 91 2.92 1.05 135 6.73 <0.0001
(F) Irrigation for crops
RF 444 2.68 1.23
NA 95 2.89 1.07 152 1.75 0.08
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Fig. 14 – PL perceptions of potential impacts by entity (N = 94–96).
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RF 440 1.70 0.88
NA 93 2.16 1.05 121 4.01 <0.0001
(H) Small businesses
RF 439 2.23 1.10
NA 95 2.53 1.12 136 2.38 0.02
(I) Farming, hunting and fishing
RF 442 2.42 1.16
NA 96 2.99 0.99 157 4.98 <0.0001
(J) Public health
RF 439 1.91 1.02
NA 95 3.13 0.95 145 11.2 <0.0001
(K) Precipitation for crops
RF 440 2.58 1.20
NA 94 2.94 1.01 154 2.99 0.0032
(L) Residential water supply availability
RF 440 2.38 1.16
NA 96 3.38 0.87 177 9.44 <0.0001
Index (sum of all questions divided by 12)
RF 433 2.25 0.92
NA 89 2.86 0.71 156 7.02 <0.00010%
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Fig. 15 – RF perceptions of potential 3.7. Space and time
Leiserowitz et al. (2009) reported that the majority of
respondents from their national survey perceived that global
warming or climate change would harm other animal and
plant species (62%) or future generations (61%) a great deal or
moderate amount, while fewer respondents said global
warming would harm them or their families a great deal or
moderate amount (32% and 35%). For Americans, global
warming or climate change, was a greater threat to other
species, people and places far away spatially and temporally,
but not to themselves, their families, or communities.
Fig. 14 illustrates that PL tribal members, unlike RF,
perceive local impacts of climate change as robust, and there
is less uncertainty (‘‘don’t know’’) the closer the subject is to the
respondent. Although the perception that climate change is
going to impact ‘‘A great deal’’ leads all other categories across
the board; and as with RF, the more distant and less related
groups are even more dominated by a relatively high percentage
of such responses.
In Fig. 15 the RF ‘‘You personally’’ and ‘‘Your family’’
responses are proportionately nearly inverse to those of tribal
members in terms of expected magnitude of change. In
contrast to groups closest to the respondents, people in least-
wealthy countries, in the future, and plants and animals areother 
lized 
ies
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impacts by entity (N = 438–445).
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and there is more uncertainty indicated. Notable are the
‘‘moderate’’ amounts of harmful impacts on people in the U.S.,
but away from home.
Once again, we conducted t-tests for comparative analysis,
including an index. Answers ranged from 1 Not at all, 2 Only a
little, 3 A moderate amount, 4 A great deal, to 5 Don’t know.
When analyzing the difference between the PL and RF views
regarding ‘‘how much you think climate change will negatively
impact the following,’’ we discovered ‘significant’ results found
below:
Group N Mean Std. dev. DF t-Value P-value
(A) You personally
RF 445 2.12 1.09
NA 95 2.80 1.26 126 4.91 <0.0001
(B) Your family
RF 442 2.20 1.12
NA 95 2.78 1.32 125 3.98 <0.0001
(C) Your surrounding community
RF 445 2.43 1.19
NA 95 2.86 1.48 121 2.66 0.009
(D) People in the United States
RF 439 2.32 1.23
NA 96 2.86 1.44 127 3.42 0.0008
(E) People in other modern industrialized countries
RF 439 2.18 1.26
NA 94 2.57 1.51 122 2.37 0.02
(F) People in least-wealthy countries
RF 440 2.30 1.37
NA 94 2.61 1.65 122 1.69 0.093
(G) Future generations of people
RF 438 2.26 1.39
NA 96 2.98 1.52 132 4.25 <0.0001
(H) Plant and animal species
RF 441 2.25 1.31
NA 94 3.21 1.35 133 6.28 <0.0001
Index (all questions added together and divided by 8)
RF 434 2.26 1.05
NA 92 2.84 1.17 124 4.37 <0.0001
Finally, in interviews with EM, these tribal leaders identified
specific impacts presently occurring due to climate change.
Impacts include: changes in animal and plant composition and
species loss; challenges to traditional lifestyle; water shortage;
and temperature extremes. Yet, our surveys revealed that climate
change planning is undeveloped or not developed at all.
3.8. Knowledge, politics, gender
Select findings help disaggregate the more voluminous RF
responses with respect to knowledge, politics and gender.
Goodman–Kruskal Gamma tests revealed that each of the eight
impact categories was significantly related with party (G
ranging from 0.35 to 0.45, all P < 0.0001), political orientation
(G ranging from 0.46 to 0.59, all P < 0.0001), gender (G ranging
from 0.31 to 0.42, all P < 0.0001), and marital status (except for
impacts on Americans, G ranging from 0.19 to 0.29, all Pranging from 0.001 to 0.03). This indicated that a significantly
large percentage of conservative, Republican, male, and
married ranchers and farmers perceive that climate change
would bring only little or no harmful impacts.
Gender had a statistically significant negative effect.
Female RF were relatively more concerned regarding adverse
impacts. With the presence of basic demographic (model 1)
and agricultural (model 2) variables, only gender was statisti-
cally significant. Those two models accounted for 6–7% of the
variations in the dependent impact variable (adjusted R2).
When the political variables were introduced (model 3), the
gender effect was mediated, although also significant. Political
ideology had the strongest significant negative effect on perceived
climate change impact, indicating that conservatives tended to
view climate change as non-harmful. Party affiliation and
marital status became significant, reflecting that unmarried
and Democratic rural residents were relatively more worried
about climate change impacts. The explanatory power of the
model was increased to 23% (conversely, it is interesting to
note that while only 5 tribal members considered themselves
Republican, their lack of support for national policies and
initiatives aimed at mitigating climate change was similar to
Republican RF, while their observations of climate change
impacts remained similar to fellow tribal members).
After the knowledge variable (cause) was added, our model
displayed a much stronger effect (P < 0.001). The adjusted R2
increased from 0.23 to 0.47, meaning that the regression model
significantly predicted perceived climate change impacts and
explained 47% of variations. Climate change knowledge had a
strong, positive effect on climate change impact, thus,
respondents with greater knowledge about climate change perceived
greater negative impacts from climate change. Political ideology
and gender remained significant, while their effects dropped
to the significance levels of 0.01 and 0.05. Party affiliation and
marital status were no longer significant.
The finding regarding the climate change knowledge
variable supports the results of two recent climate change
studies (Wood and Vedlitz, 2007; McCright, 2010). Also, this was
consistent with Hayes (2001), as greater environmental knowl-
edge does not lessen environmental concern. The impact of
political ideology was consistent with the findings of from
national climate change surveys (Leiserowitz, 2006; Dunlap and
McCright, 2008; McCright, 2010; McCright and Dunlap, 2011a,b).
Moreover, our research reveals that political orientation is the most
important variable. We discovered results for the effect of gender
on perceived climate change impacts that were similar to other
national climate change public opinion research (i.e. O’Connor
et al., 1999; Brody et al., 2008; McCright, 2010).
While we found that only a small percentage of Nevada’s RF
attribute local changes to climate change, it is noteworthy to
those interested in outreach that women show greater
concern about climate change and more scientifically accurate
knowledge, even after controlling for assessed climate change
knowledge, party identification and political orientation. In
recent research McCright (2010) presented that women
demonstrate more scientifically accurate climate change
knowledge. Women show more concern regarding environ-
mental issues, especially those posing local health/safety risks
(Brody, 1984; Mohai and Bryant, 1998; Davidson and Freuden-
burg, 1996; Bord and O’Connor, 1997; Hayes, 2001).
Fig. 16 – EM observations (N = 14).
population has added some heating, but man is not going to change
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that RF women hold a different perception and have greater
knowledge of climate change than RF men, the root causes
of this gender divide beg further investigation. Another fact
is that, generally speaking, PL places a greater value on
future generations than RF. We were able to examine
potential links between these findings by studying if RF
women were more likely to place a value on future
generations than RF men, which might partially explain
the aforementioned gender gap in the RF communities. And,
in fact, further analysis on RF men and women showed that
62.2% (N = 66) RF women and 40.3% (N = 133) RF men were
likely to place value on ‘‘future generations.’’ A two-sample
t test revealed that in contrast with RF man, RF
women were more likely value ‘‘future generations’’
(P <0.001, t = 4.01, DF = 434).
3.9. Observations
EMwhat will happen. One large volcano can cause instant global
cooling for years. You are not going to change global warming
because developing countries who are just getting out of poverty
are not going to go backwards in lifestyle and the rich (so called)
countries are not going to have enough money to pay for it all. Man
will adjust to climate change. I believe we should develop electric
cars, solar, wind, and nuclear power plants. This will take many
years so we should learn how to burn coal cleanly and use it.
I would do them all to save money – I can’t save the planet.
If you can’t adapt, you don’t deserve to survive, change is
inevitable.
Variability of weather and extremes seem to be more extreme.
. . .flight patterns of birds and lower water tables that dry up,
springs that are frequented by native animals as well as native
vegetation that are dying. . .
There is a creek by my house that flowed after snow every snow
runoff. It hasn’t had water for the past five years.Many Native Americans, like RF, spend much of their time on
the land and water, possess historical knowledge, and can
make important observations. This data, integrated within
collaborative research methodologies, may facilitate ex-
change of information if all parties desire this. Such
observations (Figs. 16–18) and priorities may bolster policy
support and voluntary actions such as those discussed later
in this paper.
Tribal observations match the biophysical modeling (see
Appendix A electronic supplementary content). In terms of EMclimate impacts, observations are about 86% for decrease in
snow packs and 79% earlier runoff. Increased summer
temperatures (71%), are also relevant to regional models. PL
records three high marks in the same categories (about 56%,
47% and 56%), and there are also noteworthy percentages for
observing less surface water and less spring water (about 72%
and 57%). Strong comments were made regarding the
movement of plants and animals in the intensifying climate
(reflecting modeling in Nevada by Guida et al., 2014).
RF have lower percentages across the board. Close to half
note snow pack decrease (48%), and a quarter (24%) note early
melting and runoff, with the same for increasing summer
temperatures (29%). However, more find less surface water
and less water from springs (45% and 37%).
3.10. Policy and voluntary action
RF
The world has been cooling & warming since its existence. There
are tree stumps in the bottom of Lake Tahoe proving this. YesO’Connor et al. (1999) reported that by the close of the 20th
century most Americans were willing take the voluntary
actions to choose more fuel efficient cars (63%), and replace
inefficient energy appliances (75%), but only a slight majority
support governmental legislation placing taxes on extremely
inefficient automobiles (55%). Only a small minority would
Fig. 17 – PL observations (N = 103).
Fig. 18 – RF observations (N = 479).
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et al. (2009) reported similar results; as merely 33% of
Americans reported they would support taxing gasoline,
however, most supported policies such as increasing vehicle
fuel efficiency to 45 mpg (79%), subsidizing energy efficient
appliances (72%) and increasing utility utilization of renew-
able energy (72%).
Figs. 19–21 assist in contrasting willingness to engage in
voluntary actions to mitigate climate change. PL and RF are
somewhat similar regarding the percentage willing to increase
the amount of insulation they use (57% and 59%), with EM at79%. With regard to the installation of light bulbs, the
percentages for all were relatively high at 86%, 71%, and 60%.
For planting trees, RF, at 53%, once again lags behind EM and PL
at about 79% and 64%. Differences were dramatic regarding
being willing to use more fuel efficient vehicles at about 93%,
47% and 54% for EM, PL and RF, this being a rare case where
percentages for RF are clearly greater than PL. It is also telling
regarding the relative ‘hardness’ of their positions, to note
that zero EM, about 8% of PL, and 13% RF would do ‘‘nothing.’’ For
RF, only actions that saved money as a byproduct earned over 50%
support.
Fig. 19 – EM voluntarily action support (N = 14).
Fig. 20 – PL voluntary action support (N = 102).
Table 6 – O.L.S. regression: support of mitigation policies.
Variable Correlation
coefficient
Standard
error
Significance
Table 5 – O.L.S. regression: willingness to engage in
mitigation.
Variable Correlation
coefficient
Standard
error
Significance
Intercept 0.066 0.228 0.772
Voting in tribal elections 0.108 0.082 0.189
Party affiliation 0.151 0.136 0.271
Beliefs regarding the
anthropogenic causes
of climate change
0.042 0.034 0.218
Beliefs regarding the
connection between
Nevada drought and
climate change
0.183 0.075 0.017
Age 0.004 0.002 0.115
Gender 0.054 0.071 0.450
Education 0.044 0.029 0.130
Household income 0.013 0.013 0.309
Adjusted R2 0.172
N 81
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Renewable energy enjoys nearly 93%, 67% and 69% support by
EM, PL, and RF respectively. Education of the public enjoyed
support at approximately 86%, 63% and a meager 33% for EM,
PL and RF. It is interesting that education, which is essentially free
and helps direct future generation’s willingness and capacity to
partner with government, is soundly rejected.
Taxation of corporations was supported by over half of EM
at about 57%, 41% of PL, and only 15% of RF. Taxing fossil fuel
enjoyed support of over 1/2 of EM at around 57%, nearly 1/3 of
PL at around 29%, but less than 10% support is attributed to RF.
Taxing citizens was supported by about 29% of EM and 10% of
PL, and a scant 2.5% of RF.Fig. 21 – RF voluntary action support (N = 479).Pressuring car companies earned around 79% support
from EM, 45% from PL and 40% from RF. Pressuring the U.S.
government to ratify international protocols, recorded about
71% support from EM, perhaps surprisingly, only 30% support
from PL, and a meager 17% of support from RF. Market
incentives were approximately 79% for EM, 37% for PL, and
28% for RF. When offered ‘‘Nothing’’ as an option, no EM
supported this, 13% of PL residents supported doing nothing
regarding climate change, and 17% of RF supported this option.
We were curious where PL’s relatively strong support of
voluntary actions originated, and so we performed additional
tests. PL member support of voluntary actions were mostly
determined by their beliefs regarding the connection between
locally experienced drought and climate change (Table 5). Other
factors such as age, gender, education, income, voting in the
tribal elections, and beliefs regarding the anthropocentric
causes of climate change were not keys. Willingness to engage
in the aforementioned five voluntary actions were averaged to
formulate the willingness to voluntarily mitigate climateIntercept 0.140 0.203 0.491
Voting in tribal elections 0.170 0.073 0.022
Party affiliation 0.310 0.121 0.012
Beliefs regarding the
anthropogenic causes
of climate change
0.003 0.030 0.912
Beliefs regarding the
connection between
Nevada drought and
climate change
0.287 0.066 0.000
Age 4.5 E5 0.002 0.983
Gender 0.064 0.063 0.313
Education 0.058 0.026 0.027
Household income 0.010 0.011 0.364
Adjusted R2 0.331
N 81
Fig. 23 – PL policy preferences (N = 102).
Fig. 22 – EM policy preferences (N = 14).
I’m not against scientific research. I just want it to be done right.
They used our blood for all these studies, people got degrees and
grants, and they never asked our permission (Carletta Tilousi, a
member of the Havasupai Tribal Council, Harmon, 2010).
RF
In early 1950’s Boy’s Scouts were sent out to plant willows on
tributaries of Klamath Lake in Oregon, under the pretense of
stopping erosion. The only thing stopped was the water flow. . . .
The lake had provided water downstream for agriculture, industry,
wildlife, and recreation. Lake water helped replenish the aquifers
downstream. Anonymous respondent who formerly held a high
position in a farming organization.
Press in 1970’s predicted new ice age. A slag of the earth’s oldest
living thing a bristlecone pine from Mt. Wheeler in WP Co (cut down
by a ‘‘scientist’’) shows through tree rings back to the time of
Abraham, that climate change is cyclical.
Climate change has become an industry, self-perpetuating with
very little true science and a lot of money spent and collected to
control lots of people’s lives.
I think D.R.I. [Desert Research Institute], via cloud seeding, has
made my weather drier!
When they tell me what the weather will be next week, I may
believe a 50 year forecast.
I worry government or congress will enact rules and regulations
using climate change as an excuse to change water & natural
resources laws, expand trade laws & taxes.
Donate money to politicians that fight this hoax.
What is harming us is the ripoff of our tax dollars to fund dubious
‘‘research’’ which is pre-ordained to come up with a liberal liar &
environmental burdens.
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accepted construct reliability).
When it comes to supporting climate change mitigation
policy, more factors shape PL members’ attitudes. In addition
to beliefs regarding the connection between Nevada’s drought
and climate change, voting in the local elections appears to
enhance mitigation policy support, while, being Republican
suppresses such support. Among the demographic factors,
education also enhances support of climate change mitigation
policies. Beliefs regarding the anthropogenic causes of climate
change, age, gender and income are all tested to be insignifi-
cant determinants. Support of the eight were averaged to
formulate the climate change mitigation policy support
indicator (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86, which indicates high
construct reliability in Table 6).Fig. 24 – RF policy preferences (N = 479).3.11. Trust in science and governmentMaibach and Hornig-Priest (2009) and others have made the
case for more ‘‘constructive engagement’’ when addressing
climate change. And in parallel, authors such as Moser (2010)
have called for ‘‘more societally relevant’’ forms of research
regarding vulnerability and adaptation to climate change. For
either of these to happen a certain baseline level of trust must be reached.
We found that EM, who serve as tribal environmental
leaders, ‘‘trust’’ scientists, water purveyors, and environmental
groups the most, each aggregated to around 80% (Fig. 25). Energy
purveyors were polarizing at 50%. Their distrust of state and city
government was clear, at only about 1/3 trusting, surpassed
only by dismal showings for local industry and the media. Also,
the percentages for all scales of government were the same for
‘‘somewhat trust’’ and ‘‘strongly distrust’’ – bleak, at over 60%.
3.12. God, fraud and GoreRF
I think it is very presumptuous of man to think he can control the earth
& weather. God made the earth & controls the weather. All the control
man can come up with would be wasted in one single volcano eruption.
The idiots profiting off of the ruse of global warming, Al Gore, etc.
PL
Our people treated our land with respect, and we continue to hold
our land as a sacred place and continue to fight for water and fight to
protect our environment. Respectful of all life, included Mother
Earth.
Fig. 25 – EM trust in sources of information (N = 13).
You non-Indians can move if you pollute the land on which you
live, but we were created for this place, so we must face whatever
happens here. We cannot move and continue to be Paiute people –
this is our land – we are this land (Calvin Meyers, Southern Paiute,
former Moapa Paiute Tribe Chairman as cited in Stoffle and
Richard, 2003, p. 1).
When asked how PL members treat the land: ‘‘Non-materialistic,
reverence for the land.’’
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However, as Lorenzoni et al. (2007) points out, and is
underscored by the quotes above, interpretations of science
are mediated by societal values, personal experience, and
other factors. ‘Hard’ data, such as the average carbon dioxide
reading surpassing 400 parts per million for the first time in
Hawaii on May 9th 2013, may grab the scientific community’s
attention. However, many of our respondents, without being
cued, tended to focus on personalities and associations, i.e. Al
Gore. Not all science is distrusted, as Biello (2013) notes, and
the head of the National Farmers Union underscores, science
that results in higher yields, less dust storms, tools for
reducing tilling passes and fuel use, and genetics that mitigate
drought and pests enjoy support. However, some RF may be
sensitive to people pointing to the science-based injection of
fossil fuel-based machines and fertilizer, methane, and
deforestation that makes agriculture the second largest source
of greenhouse gas emissions.Table 7 – Counts of references to fraud, God, and Gore.
EM PL RF
Fraud – corruption 0 3 0
Fraud – control 0 6 16
Fraud – corporations 0 1 5
Fraud – government 0 5 17
Fraud – scientists 0 0 17
God 2 9 31
Al Gore 0 0 23
Intervention will do
more harm than good
0 1 35
Request for more info 0 5 9
Request for more data 1 1 0
Request for tech assistance 1 0 1
Note: every reference to Al Gore was also a reference to govern-
ment fraud, but was not counted as such to avoid double counting.Table 7 transforms qualitative responses to open-ended
questions into quantitative counts that reveal religious belief,
cynicism and political relations. Notably, tribes often invoked
God’s name in terms of honoring what God made by taking action to
pray for and protect nature, whereas, for many ranchers and farmers,
God was the reason not to take action, as it was ‘‘arrogant’’ to believe
one could interfere with his plan.
This same dichotomy is reflected in Congress. For example,
in May 2013 U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (D) (his wife is a
marine biologist) spoke regarding God and climate change,
fighting the notion that, ‘God will not allow us to ruin our
planet.’ In contrast, the remarks by John Shimkus, Republican
representative from Illinois, are representative of the opposing
point of view (Wing, 2010). For more, Barker and Bearce (2013)
discuss empirical findings of a strong independent effect of a
belief in biblical ‘‘end times.’’ See also a special volume of the
American Behavioral Scientist (2013) by Dunlap, an introduction
to climate change and religion by Veldman et al. (2012), and a
piece on evangelical Christians and religions foundations of
climate perception by Carr et al. (2012).
3.13. A conservation ethicFollowing up on the data above, we asked the PL community
whether or not earning money from land today is a priority
over protecting it for ‘‘future generations.’’ This sustainability
question provides a window into tribal member views
regarding management of a commons across generations,
as well as the importance of economics their decision making.
Only 15% favor immediate economic interests, while 43% do
not, 37% felt that it depends on the situation, while 5% were
unsure (N = 103). This ethic manifests important character-
istics in a potential partner for climate change research
collaboration, mitigation, adaptation, and capacity building.
4. Conclusion
Our findings complement literature regarding how climate
change can be researched as a ‘‘relational phenomenon’’ and
comprehended on a local level (Brace and Geoghegan, 2010),
making it more meaningful to the public, even to those
arguably at the ‘‘boundaries,’’ such as our study groups
(Slocum, 2004; Palutikof et al., 2004; Bailey, 2008; Hulme, 2007,
2008, 2009).
Our research revealed that a mere 29% of RF believe that
human activity is playing a significant role in climate change.
Statistically, both Democrat and independent RF were far
more likely than Republicans to believe that we are experienc-
ing climate change. Importance of climate change to RF was
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Tests regarding whether climate change should be a low to
high priority for the United States government manifest a
significant difference between the PL and RF in terms of
concerns about ecosystem degradation, extreme weather,
food security, health, and water supply – with RF far less
concerned. RF perceptions of the greatest climate change
impacts tend to increase to plants, animals and other people
as they are more distant temporally and spatially. Goodman–
Kruskal Gamma tests revealed that each of our categories of
expected impacts was significantly related with party, political
orientation, gender, and marital status (except at the U.S.
scale). Non-married and Democratic rural residents were
relatively more worried about climate change impacts.
Respondents with greater knowledge about climate change
perceived greater negative impacts from climate change.
Since nearly 3/4 of RF perceived that impacts will ‘‘never
happen’’ or are ‘‘not sure,’’ approaching this subgroup for
support of policies based on future-tense arguments is
unlikely to be effective. Policy makers and agencies would gain
little traction using sustainability terminology regarding ‘‘future
generations’’ in outreach. Only renewable energy enjoys 67% or
greater support by EM, PL, and RF respectively (only money
saving actions enjoyed RF support), with very large differences
between tribal and non-tribal persons for other subcategories.
Even climate change education registers merely 33% support
from RF. Thus, there must be an alternative entry point to the
discussion about ‘future scenarios,’ and the validity of those
scenarios cannot be assumed. The best place to start is to build
bridges to groups viewed as legitimate by RF, especially
working with women, while simultaneously mitigating homo-
phily (associating only with those who are similar to you) –
rather than simply increasing the volume or complexity/
authority of educational content directed at these rural
stakeholders as a response to resistance. Women RF show
greater concern about climate change and more scientifically
accurate knowledge than men, even after controlling for other
variables, and so this may be another place to build bridges
(National Public Radio, 2014, http://www.knpr.org/son/
archive/detail2.cfm?SegmentID=11094).
Close to half of RF note snow pack decrease, but only a
quarter note early melting and runoff, and the same is true for
increasing summer temperatures, but almost 1/2 observe less
surface water and just above 1/3 observe less water from
springs. The significance of the political variable demonstrat-
ed in this paper makes the authors wonder if RF observations
of climate change might be muted by this variable? Testing
what is potentially a tension between personal observations
and personal political affiliation, and which may dominate the
other, represents a potential next stage of our research.
The great majority of tribal members believe in anthropo-
centric links to climate change, perceive local impacts of
climate change to be relatively robust, and possess relatively
less uncertainty. Over double the percentage of tribal
respondents believe that they are presently being harmed
by climate change than do RF. Climate change impacts that
tribal environmental managers report include around 86%
observing a decrease in snow packs and 79% earlier runoff.
Increased temperatures were noted by approximately 3/4 of
those surveyed. PL also records three high scores in the sameobservation categories, all around or above 50%, but about 3/4
noted less surface water and a little over 1/2 noted less water
from the springs. Qualitative responses also noted the
movement of plants and animals depriving tribes of tradition-
al resources. These observations match scientific models.
PL member support of voluntary actions was mostly
determined by their beliefs regarding the connection between
locally experienced drought and climate change. Religion
matters, as, generally speaking, tribes’ religious perspective leads
them to feel a powerful obligation to protect God’s creation – whereas
RF found God a reason for inaction, as it represented arrogance and a
lack of faith to question his plan for earth and its inhabitants.
Notably, only 15% of PL favor immediate economic interests
over protecting land for ‘‘future generations.’’
Our research manifests that, despite lower levels of
Western formal education and a horrendous history of
mistreatment by U.S. government, and at times, academia,
it is time to focus on capacity building and collaborative research with
tribes. Their decision making is not always dominated by
short-term economic gain, and they assume major climate
change impacts well into the future, while supporting diverse
policy options and voluntary actions – which is often not true
of their rural counterparts. Whereas, with regard to ranchers
and farmers in what is often termed the ‘New West’ in the arid
region of America, the aforementioned bridge-building and
reaching out to both genders should be prioritized.
Role of the funding source
Our work was funded over 5 years by the National Science
Foundation, Award # EPS-0814372. The funding source had no
involvement in study design, collection, analysis, interpreta-
tion, writing and decision on an outlet for publication.
Acknowledgments
We appreciate the time and consideration given to us by the
ranchers and farmers and Native Americans who completed
our surveys. Thank you especially to the Summit Lake Paiute
Tribe and Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe for the unique opportu-
nities to visit their lands and lakes and observe their natural
resources and tribal life. We thank Dr. Tom Piechota for his
support of our work, team building acumen, and keen insights.
We also thank Dr. Gayle Dana for her strong oversight of our
larger multi-university project. We also appreciate Dene
Charlet, Dr. David Hassenzahl, Dr. Helen Neill, Dr. Craig
Palmer, Ross Guida, Kris Bustos and Lauren Fossile for their
support of our research. Dr. Smith dedicates this work to I, III
and IV.
Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data about climate change model predic-
tions for the study area, water rights, land use and demo-
graphics can be found in the online version, at http://
dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.03.007.
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 0 1 – 1 2 2120r e f e r e n c e s
Guest editor: Riley E. Dunlap, 2013. Special Issue: Climate
Change Skepticism and Denial. American Behavioral
Scientist 57 (6), http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/0002764213477097.
Arcury, T., Scollay, S., Johnson, T., 1987. Sex differences in
environmental concern and knowledge. Sex Roles 16, 463–472.
Arbuckle Jr., J.G., Morton, L., Hobbs, J., 2013. Farmer beliefs and
concerns about climate change and attitudes toward
adaptation and mitigation: evidence from Iowa. Clim.
Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-013-0700-0 http://
www.soc.iastate.edu/staff/arbuckle.html (accessed
19.07.13).
Bailey, I., 2008. Geographical work at the boundaries of climate
policy: a commentary and complement to Mike Hulme.
Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33, 420–423.
Barker, D., Bearce, D., 2013. End-times theology, the shadow of
the future, and public resistance to addressing global climate
change. Polit. Res. Q. 66 (2) 267–279, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1177/1065912912442243.
Barnett, T.P., Pierce, D.W., Hidalgo, H.H., Bonfils, C., Santer, B.D.,
Das, T., Bala, G., Wood, A.W., Nozawa, T., Mirin, A.A., Cayan,
D.R., Dettinger, M.D., 2008. Human-induced changes in the
hydrology of the Western United States. Science, http://
dx.doi.org/10.1126/science.1152538 (online 31.01.08) http://
www.sciencemag.org/content/319/5866/1080.full.pdf?ijkey=
P8RkK7hb9o3vM&keytype=ref&siteid=sci.
Bidwell, D., Dietz, T., Scavia, D., 2013. Opinion & comment:
fostering knowledge networks for climate adaptation. Nat.
Clim. Change 3, 610–611.
Biello, D., 2013, July. U.S. Farmers View Climate Change as Just
Another Weather Challenge. In: Scientific American. http://
www.scientificamerican.com/article.cfm?id=why-farmers-
do-not-believe-in-climate-change&WT.mc_id=SA_CAT_
ENGYSUS_20130718 (accessed 19.07.13).
Bord, R., O’Connor, R., 1997. The gender gap in environmental
attitudes. Soc. Sci. Q. 78, 830–840.
Bord, R., Fisher, A., O’Connor, R., 1998. Public perceptions of
global warming: United States and international
perspectives. Clim. Res. 11, 75–84.
Borick, C., Rabe, B., 2010. A reason to believe: examining the
factors that determine individual views on global warming.
Soc. Sci. Q. 91 (3) 777–800.
Brace, C., Geoghegan, H., 2010. Human geographies of climate
change: landscape, temporality, and lay knowledges. Progr.
Hum. Geogr. 35 (1) 1–19.
Brody, S., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., Grover, H., 2008. Examining the
relationship between physical vulnerability and public
perceptions of global climate change in the United States.
Environ. Behav. 40, 72–95.
Brohan, P., Kennedy, J., Harris, I., Tett, S., Jones, P., 2006.
Uncertainty estimates in regional and global observed
temperature changes: a new dataset from 1850. J. Geophys.
Res. 111, D12106, http://dx.doi.org/10.1029/2005JD006548.
Carr, W., Patterson, M., Yung, L., Spencer, D., 2012. The faithful
skeptics: evangelical religious beliefs and perceptions of
climate change. J. Stud. Relig. Nat. Cult. 6 (3) 276–299.
Carter, N., 2008. American Indian Water Rights. Legal Ref. Serv.
Q. 27, 1–48, http://dx.doi.org/10.1300/02703190802128442.
CIER, 2008. Economic Impacts of Climate Change in Nevada. The
Center of Integrative Environmental, University of Maryland,
Whitepaper.
Coles, A., Scott, C., 2009. Vulnerability and adaptation to climate
change and variability in semi-arid rural southern Arizona,
USA. Nat. Resour. Forum 33, 297–309.
Coombes, B., Johnson, J., Howitt, R., 2012. Indigenous
geographies II: the aspirational spaces in postcolonialpolitics – reconciliation, belonging and social provision.
Progr. Hum. Geogr., http://dx.doi.org/10.1177/
0309132512469590.
Davidson, D., Freudenburg, W., 1996. Gender and environmental
risk concerns. Environ. Behav. 28, 302–339.
Deacon, J., Williams, A., Williams, C., Williams, J., 2007. Fueling
population growth in Las Vegas: how large-scale
groundwater withdrawal could burn regional biodiversity.
Bioscience 57 (8) 688–698.
Dietz, T., Dan, A., Shwom, R., 2007. Support for climate change
policy: social psychological and social structural influences.
Rural Sociol. 72, 185–214.
Dunlap, R., McCright, A., 2008. A widening gap: republican
and democratic views on climate change. Environment 50 (5)
26–35.
Environmental Politics, 2013. Special Issue: Climate Change:
Ethics, Rights and Policies 22 (3) (entire volume).
Guida, R.J., Abella, S.R., Smith Jr., W.J., Stephen, H., Roberts, C.L.,
2014. Climatic change and desert vegetation distribution:
assessing 30 years of change in southern Nevada’s Mojave
Desert. Professional Geogr. 66 (2) 311–322, http://dx.doi.org/
10.1080/00330124.2013.787007 http://www.tandfonline.com/
doi/full/10.1080/00330124.2013.787007#.U0xyzVca1TY.
Habbermas, J., 1991. The Structural Transformation of the
Public Sphere (original German version 1962). MIT Press,
Boston.
Hamilton, L., Keim, B., 2009. Regional variation in
perceptions about climate change. Int. J. Climatol. 29,
2348–2352.
Hamilton, L., 2010. Education, politics, and opinions about
climate change: evidence for interaction effects. Clim.
Change, http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10584-010-9957-8.
Hansen, J., Ruedy, R., Sato, M., Imhoff, M., Lawrence, W.,
Easterling, D., Peterson, T., Karl, T., 2001. A closer look at
United States and global surface temperature change. J.
Geophys. Res. 106 (D20) 23947–23963.
Harmon, A., 2010, April. Indian Tribe Wins Fight to Limit
Research of Its DNA. The New York Times http://
www.nytimes.com/2010/04/22/us/22dna.html?th=&emc=
th&pagewanted=print (accessed 06.10.12).
Hayes, B., 2001. Gender, scientific knowledge, and attitudes
toward the environment. Polit. Res. Q. 54, 657–671.
Headwaters Economics, 2012. Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
Reservation NV. Produced by the Economic Profile System-
Human Dimensions Toolkit (EPS-HDT: Socioeconomic
Profiles) http://headwaterseconomics.org/tools/eps-hdt
(accessed 15.06.12).
Holcup, P., Tripp-Reimer, T., Salois, E., Weinert, C., 2004.
Community-based participatory research: an approach to
intervention research with a Native American Community.
Adv. Nurs. Sci. 27 (3) 162–175.
Hulme, M., 2007. Viewpoint: understanding climate change –
the power and the limit of science. Weather 62, 243–244.
Hulme, M., 2008. Geographical work at the boundaries of
climate change. Trans. Inst. Br. Geogr. 33, 5–11.
Hulme, M., 2009. Why We Disagree about Climate Change.
Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Inter-Tribal Council of Nevada, 2014. Homepage. http://
www.itcn.org/programs-admin-by-itcn.html and http://
ndep.nv.gov/tribe/tlp.htm (accessed 24.03.14).
Kellstedt, P., Zahran, S., Vedlitz, A., 2008. Personal efficacy, the
information environment, and attitudes toward global
warming and climate change in the United States. Risk Anal.
28, 113–126.
Krosnick, J., Holbrook, A., Visser, P., 2000. The impact of the fall
2007 debate about global warming on American public
opinion. Public Understand. Sci. 9, 239–260.
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, Smith, N., 2010.
Global Warming’s Six Americas. Yale Project on Climate
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 0 1 – 1 2 2 121Change http://environment.yale.edu/climate/files/
SixAmericasJune2010.pdf (accessed 17.06.13).
Leiserowitz, A., Maibach, E., Roser-Renouf, C., 2009. Climate
change in the American mind: Americans’ climate change
beliefs, attitudes, policy preferences, and actions. Yale
Project on Climate Change, New Haven, CT.
Leiserowitz, A., 2006. Climate change risk perception and policy
preferences: the role of affect, imagery, and values. Clim.
Change 77, 45–72.
Leiserowitz, A., 2005. American risk perceptions: is climate
change dangerous? Risk Anal. 25, 1433–1442.
Leiserowitz, A., 2003. Global warming in the American mind: the
roles of affect, imagery, and worldviews in risk perception,
policy preferences and behavior (unpublished dissertation).
University of Oregon, Eugene.
Lorenzoni, I., Nicholson-Cole, S., Whitmarsh, L., 2007. Barriers
perceived to engaging with climate change among the UK
public and their policy implications. Global Environ. Chang.
445–459.
Maibach, E., Hornig-Priest, S., 2009. No more ‘business as usual’:
addressing climate change through constructive
engagement. Sci. Commun. 30, 299–304.
Malka, A., Krosnick, J., Langer, G., 2009. The association of
knowledge with concern about global warming: trusted
information sources shape public thinking. Risk Anal. 29,
633–647.
Mann, M., Bradley, R., Hughes, M., 1999. Northern hemisphere
temperatures during the past millennium: inferences,
uncertainties, and limitations. Geophys. Res. Lett. 26,
759–762.
McCright, A., Dunlap, R., 2011a. Cool dudes: the denial of
climate change among conservative white males in the
United States. Global Environ. Chang. 21 (4) 1163–1172.
McCright, A., Dunlap, R., 2011b. The politicization of climate
change and polarization in the American public’s views of
global warming, 2001–2010. Sociol. Q. 52, 155–194.
McCright, A., 2010. The effects of gender on climate change
knowledge and concern in the American public. Popul.
Environ. 32 (1) 66–87.
Mohai, P., Bryant, B., 1998. Is there a ‘‘race’’ effect on
concern for environmental quality? Public Opin. Q. 62,
475–505.
Moser, S., 2010. Now more than ever: the need for more
societally relevant research on vulnerability and adaptation
to climate change. Appl. Geogr. 30, 464–474.
National Congress of American Indians, 2009, September. The
Silent Depression: How Are Minorities Faring in the
Economic Downturn? A testimony for the United States
Congress.
National Public Radio, 2014, April. Panel Discussion: How Will
Nevada Adapt to Climate Change? http://www.knpr.org/
son/archive/detail2.cfm?SegmentID=11094.
Nevada Department of Transportation, 2007. Indian
Reservations and Colonies in Nevada. http://ndep.nv.gov/
tribe/tribal.map03.pdf (accessed 02.03.09).
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration, 2005.
Observed Trends and Variability in Land and Ocean Surface
Temperatures. National Climatic Data Center http://
www.ncdc.noaa.gov/oa/climate/research/trends.html
(accessed 04.09.12).
O’Connor, R., Bord, R., Fisher, A., 1999. Risk perceptions, general
environmental beliefs, and willingness to address climate
change. Risk Anal. 19, 455–465.
Palutikof, J., Agnew, M., Hoar, M., 2004. Public perceptions of
unusually warm weather in the UK: impacts, responses and
adaptations. Clim. Res. 26, 43–59.
Pew Research Center, 2007. Global Warming: A Divide on Causes
and Solutions. http://people-press.org/files/legacy-pdf/
303.pdf (accessed 27.11.12).Pew Research Center, 2010. Little Change in Opinions About
Global Warming. October 2010 Political Survey, Washington,
DC Available from: http://people-press.org/2010/10/27/little-
change-in-opinions-about-global-warming/ (accessed
27.11.12).
Pierce, D.W., Barnett, T.P., Hidalgo, H.G., Das, T., Bonfils, C.,
Santer, B.D., Bala, G., Dettinger, M.D., Cayan, D.R., Mirin, A.,
Wood, A.W., Nozawa, T., 2008. Attribution of declining
Western U.S. snowpack to human effects. J. Clim. 21,
6425–6444 http://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf/10.1175/
2008JCLI2405.1.
Quigley, D., Handy, D., Goble, R., Sanchez, V., George, P., 2000.
Participatory research strategies in nuclear risk management
for native communities. J. Health Commun. 5, 305–331.
Sachs, W., 1993. Global ecology and the shadow of ‘development’.
In: Sachs, W. (Ed.), Global Ecology: A New Arena of Political
Conflict. Zed Books, London/New Jersey, pp. 3–21.
Safi, A., Smith Jr., W., Liu, Z., 2012. Nevada ranchers and
farmers: perceived risks of the impacts of climate change.
Risk Anal. 32 (6) 1041–1059.
Shwom, R., Dietz, T., Dan, A., 2008. The effects of information
and state of residence on climate change policy support.
Clim. Change 90, 343–358.
Shwom, R., Bidwell, D., Dan, A., Dietz, T., 2010. Understanding
U.S. public support of domestic climate change policies.
Global Environ. Chang. 20, 472–482.
Slocum, R., 2004. Polar bears and energy-efficient light bulbs:
strategies to bring climate change home. Environ. Plan. D:
Soc. Space 22, 413–438.
Smith, T., Reynolds, R., 2005. A global merged land air and sea
surface temperature reconstruction based on historical
observations (1880–1997). J. Clim. 18, 2021–2036.
Smith Jr., W., Safi, A., Liu, Z., Chief, K., Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe
and Summit Lake Paiute Tribe, 2014. Native Americans and
climate change: epistemological, historical, and cultural
imperatives for community based participatory research
(submitted for publication).
Smith Jr., W.J., Fruth, L., 2012. Video: Native Americans and
Climate Change in Nevada. Sponsored by NSF funding
http://epscorspo.nevada.edu/native-american-indian-video/
Stern, P., Ebi, K., Leichenko, R., Olson, R., Steinbruner, J.,
Lempert, R., 2013. Opinion & comment: managing risk with
climate vulnerability science. Nat. Clim. Change 3, 607–609.
Stoffle, R., Richard, A., 2003. Confronting the angry rock:
American Indians’ situated risks from radioactivity. Ethnos
68 (2) 230–248.
Trenberth, K., Jones, P., Ambenje, P., Bojariu, R.,
Easterling, D., Klein Tank, A., Parker, D., Rahimzadeh, F.,
Renwick, J., Rusticucci, M., Soden, B., Zhai, P., 2007.
Observations: surface and atmospheric climate change.
In: Solomon, S., Qin, D., Manning, M., Chen, Z., Marquis,
M., Averyt, K.B., Tignor, M., Miller, H.L. (Eds.), Climate
Change 2007: The Physical Science Basis. Contribution of
Working Group I to the Fourth Assessment Report of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. Cambridge
University Press, Cambridge, United Kingdom and New
York, NY, USA.
Truckee River Operating Agreement, 2013. http://www.troa.net
(accessed June 2013).
United States Census Bureau, 2005. State Interim Population
Projections by Age and Sex: 2004–2030. http://
www.census.gov/population/www/projections/
projectionsagesex.html (accessed 27.11.12).
United States Census Bureau, 2003. Nevada: 2000 Summary
Social, Economic, and Housing Characteristics. U.S. Census
Bureau, Washington, DC.
U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2012. Economic Research
Service. http://www.ers.usda.gov/StateFacts/NV.htm
(accessed 27.11.12).
e n v i r o n m e n t a l s c i e n c e & p o l i c y 4 2 ( 2 0 1 4 ) 1 0 1 – 1 2 2122U.S. Department of Agriculture, 2007. Census of Agriculture.
http://www.agcensus.usda.gov/Publications/2007/Full_Rep
ort/Census_by_State/Nevada/ (accessed 27.11.12).
U.S. Global Change Research Program, 2000. Potential
consequences of climate variability and change for the
Western United States. In: Smith, J.B., Richels, R., Miller, B.
(Eds.), Climate Change Impacts on the United States: The
Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change.
Washington, DC. www.usgcrp.gov/usgcrp/Lib rary/
nationalassessment/08West.pdf (accessed 27.11.12).
U.S. Senator Sheldon Whitehouse, 2013. Seth Larson,
Communications Director. http://www.whitehouse.senate.
gov/news/speeches/ti me-to-wake-up-magicalthinking-on-
climate-change (accessed 05.07.13).
Veldman, R.G., Szasz, A., Haluza-DeLay, R., 2012. Introduction:
climate change and religion – a review of existing research. J.
Stud. Relig. Nat. Cult. 6 (3) 276–299.Western Regional Climate Center, 2013. Historical Data. http://
www.wrcc.dri.edu/ (accessed 27.11.12).
Wing, N., 2010, November 13, updated November 25. John
Shimkus, GOP Rep. Who Denies Climate Change On
Religious Grounds, Could Lead House Environmental Policy.
The Huffington Post. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
11/13/john-shimkus-climate-change_n_782664.html
(accessed 05.06.13).
Wood, B., Vedlitz, A., 2007. Issue definition, information
processing, and the politics of global warming. Am. J. Polit.
Sci. 51, 552–568.
Woods, M., 2010. Performing rurality and practising rural
geography. Progr. Hum. Geogr. 34 (6) 835–846.
WorldPublicOpinion.org, 2009. Publics Want More Government
Action on Climate Change. Global poll http://
www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/
btenvironmentra/631.php (accessed 27.11.12).
